Florida Supreme Court affirms denial of Paul Everett's request for DNA testing
The Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Everett's motion for postconviction DNA testing.
Today was the Florida Supreme Court’s first regular release of opinions for the year.
The Court released five opinions, one of which was a capital case. In Everett v. State, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Paul Everett’s request for postconviction DNA testing.
In 2003, Everett was sentenced to death for crimes that occurred in 2001. Everett admitted to beating and raping the victim but “denied knowing that he killed” her. The Court affirmed Everett’s convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal in 2004. Since then, the Court has denied Everett’s initial and successive motions for postconviction relief. Everett has also unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief.
In 2022, Everett sought postconviction DNA testing of 15 items that he claimed would link the murder scene to another person “with whom he had been staying in a motel near [the victim’s] home at the time of the murder.” The circuit court denied Everett’s motion, “concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the testing Everett sought would produce an acquittal or lesser sentence in light of the overwhelming evidence against him and the minimal value of proving that [the other person’s] DNA was on the proposed items.”
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling. First, the Court took issue with Everett’s motion, saying it did not plead entitlement to relief properly:
Everett alleged that if the testing sought revealed Farmer’s DNA on the items, such evidence could result in an acquittal or a finding of guilt of a lesser offense. But section 925.11 and rule 3.853 require a movant to plead that “the DNA testing requested” “will exonerate the” movant “or will mitigate the sentence.” § 925.11(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Further, the Court reasoned that Everett’s innocence theory was inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial, including his confession:
“[W]here a defendant has confessed and the record supplies no substantial basis to doubt the identity of the perpetrator, he cannot show a reasonable probability of acquittal. . . .
Everett’s admissions to law enforcement on November 27, 2001, that he burglarized Bailey’s home, beat her, forcibly raped her, and jerked and twisted her neck during the attack were admitted at trial. Everett told law enforcement that no one else was present at the time of the murder.
. . . .
There was no evidence presented at Everett’s trial that he falsely confessed or that anyone else was responsible for the murder or present at the scene. Thus, anything relating to those claims—e.g., that Everett’s admissions were false, that Farmer was present at the scene of the murder, that Farmer had threatened Everett into giving a false confession, that Farmer knew details of the murder that only someone present would know—are irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether the DNA testing sought would yield a reasonable probability of an acquittal had it been introduced at his trial. The sole question before this Court today is whether there is a reasonable probability that an objectively reasonable factfinder at Everett’s trial would have acquitted him or given a lesser sentence if evidence that Farmer’s DNA was on the items of which Everett sought testing had been introduced along with the rest of the evidence as it was presented at his trial. And this question must be answered without consideration of any alleged “evidence” that was not introduced at the trial.
The Court also agreed with the circuit court that there “is no reasonable probability” that the DNA testing would mitigate Everett’s sentence.
The Court’s decision was unanimous.
The full decision can be downloaded here.