NEW WARRANT: David Pittman's execution scheduled September 17
This afternoon, Gov. DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling David Joseph Pittman’s execution for September 17, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. It is the 12th execution set in the State this year.
This afternoon, Gov. DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling David Joseph Pittman’s execution for September 17, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. It is the 12th execution set in the State this year.
Background of Pittman’s Case
On April 19, 1991, a Polk County jury convicted David J. Pittman of murdering Clarence and Barbara Knowles, the parents of Pittman’s estranged wife, and their daughter, Bonnie Knowles, on May 15, 1990.1 The facts are as follows:
The record reflects that, shortly after 3 a.m. on May 15, 1990, a newspaper deliveryman in Mulberry, Florida, reported to law enforcement authorities that he had just seen a burst of flame on the horizon. When the authorities investigated they found the home of Clarence and Barbara Knowles fully engulfed in fire. After the fire was extinguished, the police entered the house and discovered the bodies of Clarence and Barbara, as well as the body of their twenty-year-old daughter, Bonnie. Although all of the bodies were burned in the fire, a medical examiner determined that the cause of death in each instance was massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds. In addition, the medical examiner testified that Bonnie Knowles' throat had been cut. A subsequent investigation revealed that the fire was the result of arson, that the phone line to the house had been cut, and that Bonnie Knowles' brown Toyota was missing.
A construction worker testified that, when he arrived at work at 6:30 a.m. on the morning of the fire, he noticed a brown Toyota in a ditch on the side of the road near his job site. Other testimony revealed that the location of the Toyota was about one-half mile from the Knowles residence. The worker also observed a homemade wrecker, which he later identified as belonging to Pittman, pull up to the Toyota and, shortly thereafter, saw a cloud of smoke coming from that direction. Another witness who lived near the construction site also saw the smoke and observed a man running away from a burning car. This witness later identified Pittman from a photo-pack as the man she saw that morning. Investigators determined that the car fire, like the earlier house fire, was the work of an arsonist.
At the time of the murders, another of the Knowles' daughters, Marie, was in the process of divorcing Pittman. The divorce was not amicable and the State introduced testimony that Pittman had made several threats against Marie and her family. The State also produced evidence that Pittman had recently learned that Bonnie Knowles had tried to press criminal charges against him for an alleged rape that had occurred five years earlier.
Carl Hughes, a jailhouse informant, testified that Pittman told him that he had gone to the Knowles' house on the evening of the murders to speak with Bonnie Knowles about the problems he was having with her family. Bonnie let Pittman in the house and, when she refused his sexual advances, he killed her to stop her cries for help. Pittman then admitted to killing Barbara Knowles in the hallway outside Bonnie's bedroom and to killing Clarence in the living room as Clarence tried to use the phone. Pittman also told Hughes that he burned the house, stole the Toyota and abandoned it on the side of the road, and later returned to the Toyota and burned it as well.
The record further reflects that Pittman feared that the police suspected his involvement in the murders, and, at the prompting of his mother, Pittman turned himself in to the police on the day after the murders.2
After a penalty phase that included a “powerful presentation of mitigating evidence,”3 the jury recommended death on three counts of first-degree murder by a vote of 9-3. The trial court sentenced Pittman to death on each count, finding two aggravating factors for each murder:
(1) previous conviction of another capital or violent felony, and (2) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The judge then expressly rejected the mitigating factors of Pittman's being under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance and concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the proven mitigating factors.4
Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, Pittman raised 10 issues:
(1) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of collateral crimes and bad acts; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting identification testimony; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding hearsay statements of a third party's alleged confession; (4) whether the trial court failed to hold a presentencing hearing; (5) whether the trial court rendered a legally insufficient sentencing order; (6) whether the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague; (7) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance; (8) whether the trial court erred in failing to find the two statutory mental mitigating circumstances; (9) whether the trial court erred in failing to find nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; (10) whether the death penalty is disproportionate in this case.5
In a unanimous opinion issued September 29, 1994, the Florida Supreme Court rejected each claim and affirmed Pittman’s convictions and sentences of death.6
His death sentences became final in 1995.
Initial Postconviction & State Habeas
On March 24, 1997, Pittman filed his initial motion for postconviction relief, which was ultimately amended several times before the circuit court’s final ruling on November 5, 2007, denying relief.7
On appeal, Pittman raised “nine guilt phase issues and three penalty phase issues.”8 His guilt phase issues were:
(1) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215(1963), with respect to inmate Carl Hughes; (2) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to inmate David Pounds; (3) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to the handwritten notes of other witness interviews; (4) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to Dennis Waters' identification of the wrecker; (5) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to the letter concerning William Smith; (6) whether the postconviction court erred in denying relief based on the cumulative effect of all the withheld and newly discovered evidence; (7) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), claim; (8) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (9) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his newly discovered evidence claim.
His penalty phase issues were:
(10) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim; (11) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (12) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his newly discovered evidence claim.9
Pittman also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising six issues:
(1) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in affirming the exclusion of certain evidence; (3) whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in affirming Pittman's convictions and sentences where the State withheld pertinent facts; (4) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that Pittman's death sentences were based on an improper aggravator; (5) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the prosecutor used improper argument in the penalty phase; and (6) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the penalty phase jury was misled by improper comments and instructions.10
On June 30, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court denied relief.
Justice Pariente concurred in result for two reasons: (1) “the majority could be read to approve of the trial court's misstatements of the law—statements that there is a due diligence requirement in Brady and statements that appear to emphasize that the prosecutor did not have knowledge of notes in the possession of police in denying Pittman's Brady claims,” and (2) she “disagree[d] with the manner in which the majority set[] forth the prejudice prong of Brady.”11
Federal Habeas
In mid-2012, Pittman filed a federal habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida raising 8 claims. On February 20, 2015, the Middle District denied the petition. The district court declined a certificate of appealability (COA), but the U.S. Court of Appeals granted a COA on two issues
As for the exclusion of evidence, the court determined that the Florida Supreme Court had applied a procedural bar in its decision on postconviction review and that this constituted an adequate and independent state law ground to deny relief. In the alternative, however, it addressed the merits and concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. As for ineffectiveness of counsel, the district court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's Strickland determination was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.12
On September 22, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit denied relief on both claims.
On the first issue, the Eleventh Circuit concluded:
The long and short of it is that Pittman sought to admit into evidence testimony from a death row inmate who claimed to have received and then destroyed a letter in which the lynchpin witness who put him on death row allegedly confessed to the triple homicide Pittman was accused of. It is not hard to understand why the trial court was skeptical of this story. Corroborating a peripheral fact here or there does not overcome the essential reliability concerns presented by this evidence. Whether applying deference or not, we can discern no error in this determination.
On the second issue, the Court summarized Pittman’s claim as “argue[ing] that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of the trial by failing to uncover and present additional evidence regarding Pittman's abusive childhood, substance abuse, and mental health, including the possibility that Pittman had brain damage.” The Court denied relief on this claim, finding no basis to hold that the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling was unreasonable.
Judge Jordan wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that Pittman was not entitled to relief but for a different reason.
Successive Postconviction
In 2015, Pittman filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, which was later amended. Ultimately, he sought relief based on alleged intellectual disability.13 The circuit court denied the claim without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the claim was untimely.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the denial, relying on its 2020 decision in Phillips that Hall v. Florida does not apply retroactively. Phillips receded from the Court’s prior decision in Walls v. State that Hall does apply retroactively.
Justice Labaraga dissented, reiterating his disagreement with the Court’s decision in Phillips.
Florida Supreme Court’s Scheduling Order
Shortly after the warrant, the Florida Supreme Court issued its standard scheduling order for warrant=related litigation. The Order sets forth the following schedule:
August 29 at 11:00 a.m.: circuit court proceedings completed
August 29 at 1:00 p.m.: notice of appeal due
August 31 at 2:00 p.m.: initial brief due
September 2 at 2:00 p.m.: answer brief due
September 3 at 11:00 a.m.: reply brief due
My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.
Pittman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., No. 8:12–cv–1600–T–17EAJ, 2015 WL 736417, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2015) (citation omitted)..
Id. at *1-2 (citation omitted).
Pittman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 871 F.3d 1231, 1240 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
Pittman v. State, 646 So.2d 167, 170 n.3 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 173.
Pittman v. State, 90 So.3d 794, 806 (Fla. 2011).
Id.
Id. at n.8.
Id. at n.9.
Id. at 820 (Pariente, J., concurring in result).
Pittman, 871 F.3d at 1243.
Pittman v. State, 337 So.3d 776, 777 (Fla. 2022).