BELL WARRANT: Circuit Court denies Bell's claims
Less than twenty-four hours after the evidentiary hearing concluded, the Circuit Court issued an Order denying Bell's claims.
Michael Bell’s execution is scheduled for July 15 at 6:00 p.m. Less than twenty-four hours after the evidentiary hearing on Bell’s claims concluded, the Circuit Court issued an Order denying Bell’s claims.
Bell’s Emergency Motion for Reconsideration
Just before 9:00 this morning, Bell, through his attorneys, filed an Emergency Motion asking the Court to reconsider its rulings allowing the witnesses at yesterday’s hearing to invoke the Fifth Amendment. (TFDP covered the hearing here.)
The motion argues that the Court improperly allowed the witnesses to invoke the Fifth Amendment on questions that would not have incriminated them. The full motion can be downloaded here.
Order Denying Bell’s Motion to Interview Jurors
On Monday afternoon, the Circuit Court issued an Order denying Bell’s motion to interview jurors (covered by TFDP here). The Order says the request was “filed thirty years too late” and that Bell “cannot show good cause for th[e] delay because the conduct purportedly justifying the[] interviews is plain from the face of the record.”
The full Order can be downloaded here.
Order Denying Bell’s Postconviction Claims
This morning, the Circuit Court issued an Order denying Bell’s successive motion for postconviction relief.
Newly Discovered Evidence
First, the Court determined that Bell’s claims of newly discovered evidence related to Edwards’ and James’ recantations are untimely:
[Bell] did not explain why CHU North waited to reveal the alleged recantations of two witnesses who testified against Defendant until after the death warrant was signed. Nor did Defendant ever state or present credible evidence to establish which CHU unit first learned of the purported new evidence and when that occurred. Fundamentally, Defendant did not prove that it has been less than one year since Henry Edwards and Charles Jones allegedly recanted. Therefore, Subclaims One and Two are untimely.
Notwithstanding, the Court addressed the claims on the merits. As to Edwards, the Court determined that “Edwards’ failure to recant his previous testimony under oath at the evidentiary hearing is ultimately fatal to [Bell’s] claim.”
At the evidentiary hearing, Henry Edwards not only stood by his trial testimony, but also directly stated that the contents of the affidavit were not true. Edwards stated that he provided information to Detective Bolena, but nothing he told him or testified about at trial has changed. He acknowledged that he had signed the affidavit, but he did not read or write it and simply went along with what the CHU Investigators told him had happened because he did not want Defendant to be executed. When questioned about the specifics of his trial testimony Edwards invoked his right against self-incrimination except for the fact that he reiterated that he was outside of the liquor lounge when the shooting occurred.
The Court further determined that “Edwards’ testimony that he did not know what was in the affidavit [was] more credible than CHU Investigator Colin Kelly’s testimony that the affidavit reflected statements made by Mr. Edwards.” The Court determined that “Edwards testified sincerely that he only signed the affidavit because he believed, based on the CHU Investigators’ representations, that doing so would save Defendant’s life. Edwards also seemed genuinely confused as to who exactly the CHU Investigators were, sometimes referring to them as people looking for statements to prepare a script for a documentary on Defendant’s case.”
The Court acknowledged testimony of Edwards’ family members that Edwards was a confidential informant for Detective Bolena but stated that neither witness “testified to any specifics about Edwards’ role” in Bell’s case. Therefore, the Court denied Bell’s claim related to Edwards on the merits.
As to Jones, the Court again denied the claim on the merits because Jones “invoked his right against self-incrimination,” “did not recant and did not testify, leaving the Court nothing to evaluate the credibility of.”
As to Bell’s other claims of newly discovered evidence—at issue in Bell’s motion to amend—the Court determined the claims were procedurally barred because Bell “failed to adequately allege why these claims were not discoverable with the use of due diligence during his previous postconviction proceedings.”
Notwithstanding, the Court addressed the claims on the merits. As to Erica Williams, the Court found her testimony to be credible but denied Bell’s claim:
At the hearing, Erica Williams testified that Detective Bolena left her a business card in her door jam, and she was soon after summoned to the police station for questioning. Once at the police station, she was placed into an interrogation room for twelve to fourteen hours. She described that time as filled with detectives yelling at her and treating her meanly. When questioned about whether she was threatened with incarceration or losing her children unless she testified a certain way, at yesterday’s hearing, she asserted her right against self-incrimination and refused to answer any more questions related to these alleged statements she made to CHU Investigators. . . . Defendant’s allegations of newly discovered impeachment evidence that the State pressured and intimidated Erica Williams to testify, however, are not proven. Rather, it appears the State generally outlined the reasonable possible outcomes Ms. Williams faced if she refused to testify pursuant to a subpoena about what she had heard Defendant say regarding the murders or her purchasing the gun Defendant used in the murder for him, knowing Defendant was a convicted felon. Additionally, there is no evidence the State knowingly put on false evidence through Erica Williams’ trial testimony. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof and this subclaim is denied.
As to Ned Pryor, the Court determined his testimony was not credible, saying he “appeared to be confused, and he lacked memory about what he testified to at trial.” Further, the Court concluded that “even if Ned Pryor’s evidentiary hearing testimony that he was not at the liquor lounge was credible, Defendant has failed to prove the State knowingly or should have known Ned Pryor’s testimony at trial was false. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof and this subclaim is denied.”
As to Dale George, the Court found his testimony to be credible but denied the claim:
At the hearing, Dale George testified that he recalls speaking to the CHU Investigators, but did not recall telling them any of the things they wrote in their interview notes. He also stated that he was familiar with Detective Bolena but could not recall specifically dealing with him in the instant case. When questioned about whether Detective Bolena used physical violence against him and other forms of intimidation, George asserted his right against self-incrimination and refused to answer any more questions related to his alleged statements made to CHU Investigators. . . . Defendant’s allegations of newly discovered impeachment evidence that the State pressured and intimidated Dale George to testify are not proven. Additionally, there is no evidence the State knowingly put on false evidence through Dale George’s trial testimony. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof and this subclaim is denied.
As to Paula Goins, the Court found her testimony that she testified truthfully at trial credible:
At the hearing, Paula Goins testified that Detective Bolena and George Bateh pressured her to testify truthfully about the things she overheard Defendant discuss with his then girlfriend Erica Williams the night of the murder. Ms. Goins was strong in her belief that these actions never amounted to threats, instead explaining that they told her she could lose her job, home, grandchild, and face incarceration if she did not testify truthfully at the grand jury and trial proceedings. Ms. Goins also stated that she was represented by counsel at this time, and he was present with her whenever she spoke to investigators or testified. When asked if she had testified truthfully at trial, Ms. Goins said that she testified to what she heard from Defendant and Erica Williams the night of the murders. At times, Ms. Goins also testified that she believed Detective Bolena and Prosecutor Bateh twisted her words from “we to I” when recounting what Defendant told her that night, but at other times she equivocated. She never recanted her trial testimony or said it was untrue.
Defendant emphasized at the hearing the distinction between Ms. Goins’ testimony about “we and I,” but it was clear from her testimony that she did not remember specifics from trial, but did recall the general premise that she testified truthfully at trial to what she heard. Given her age, cancer treatments, length of time, and self-admitted attempts to block any memories of the night because of the trauma it has caused her, the Court cannot find her completely reliable as to the specifics of her testimony yesterday, but can find her credible that she testified truthfully at trial. Considering everything Ms. Goins testified to at the evidentiary hearing, the Court does not find that there is newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. Ms. Goins was selfadmittedly not threatened and her description of what she was told by the State does not constitute undue pressure, such as Detective Bolena staring at her and standing close to her. Rather, it appears to have generally outlined the reasonable possible outcomes if Ms. Goins refused to testify to what she had heard Defendant say about the murders. For example, Defendant pointed to George Bateh’s reference to contempt at Defendant’s trial, but contempt is a legal consequence for failure to appear in response to a subpoena. Thus, Defendant’s allegations of newly discovered impeachment evidence that the State threatened Paula Goins to testify are not proven. Additionally, there is no evidence the State knowingly put on false evidence through Paula Goins’ trial testimony. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof and this subclaim is denied.1
In its conclusion, the Court wrote:
A common theme with all of Defendant’s newly discovered witnesses is that they all allegedly made incredible statements to investigators for Defendant’s federal counsel, after the death warrant was signed, about systemic prosecutorial misconduct that resulted in all their trial testimony being coerced and false. However, once Defendant called them to the stand their testimony did not support Defendant’s allegations. The testimony did not demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, but rather that the State leveraged the law permissibly to prosecute Defendant’s crimes.
Although Defense counsel insisted the testimony established newly discovered impeachment evidence, the coercion evidence could have been discovered with due diligence. These are all witnesses with some relation to Defendant, it is reasonable that procuring their testimony might require some convincing. None of the testimony brought out at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates the State’s actions were of such a threatening nature that they amounted to the prosecutorial misconduct necessary to warrant relief. Further, even if all this suggestion of supposed threats had been presented at trial, Defendant has failed to connect how the credibility of these witnesses is weakened. Defendant never makes the connection that the witnesses embellished or fabricated their testimony to avoid these threats. On the contrary, it appears all of them were appropriately aware of how important testifying truthfully was. Accordingly, to the extent it was not discussed before, the Court finds Defendant has failed to prove this evidence, both individually and cumulatively, is of such a nature that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome had he known about it.2
NOTE: The bold assertion in the Court’s Order above is difficult to square with the fact that each witness either falsely signed an Affidavit under oath or falsely testified in court yesterday.
Constitutional Claims
On Bell’s second claim related to racially charged comments at trial, the Court determined the claim is procedurally barred and “could and should have been raised on direct appeal and are, therefore, procedurally barred . . . .” Further, “to the extent Defendant claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel for also resorting to racially insensitive argument, that claim is untimely.”
As to the death qualification process, the Court said that Bell’s claim is also procedurally barred and untimely.
Warrant Process
On Bell’s claim related to the warrant process, the Court denied the claim, writing:
Defendant has not identified any matter on which he has been denied notice and an opportunity to be heard. Defendant was able to litigate his claims at an evidentiary hearing, and the Court also allowed him to present additional evidence on “emergency” claims filed the day before the hearing.
Ineffective Assistance
On Bell’s final claim, the Court says Bell “attempts to relitigate the entirety of this case by alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial level and in subsequent postconviction proceedings” and “raises no cognizable claims . . ., as they are either procedurally barred or lack legal merit.”
The full Order can be downloaded here.
Bell will now appeal the Circuit Court’s ruling to the Florida Supreme Court. The schedule for the appeal was posted by TFDP here.
News Articles
TFDP Prior Coverage of Bell’s Warrant
My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.
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