Execution by Jury Override - Part II: Beauford White
Welcome to Part II of Execution by Jury Override, TFDP's latest series, reviewing the cases of those executed in Florida as a result of jury override. This Part discusses the case of Beauford White.
Welcome to Part II of Execution by Jury Override, the latest series by TFDP. (Part I can be accessed here.)
Introduction
Before Hurst,1 Florida allowed what is called a “jury override,” which is where the trial court imposed a sentence of death despite the jury recommending a sentence of life. According to an article published by the Florida State University Law Review in spring 1985 by Michael Mello and Ruthann Robson, Judge over Jury: Florida’s Practice of Imposing Death over Life in Capital Cases,2 as of that time, “Florida [was] one of only three states [that] allow[ed] a judge to override a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment.” As TFDP previously covered, two people currently on Florida’s death row were sentenced to death by jury override.
As Mello and Robson further explained, as of spring 1985, Florida was “the only state that ha[d] actually executed a person despite the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence.” As of that time, Florida had executed three people sentenced to death by jury override. Consistent with Mello and Robson’s prediction, Florida continued doing so with at least one more execution in 1995. This series reviews the cases of those executed as a result of jury override.
Beauford White
Beauford White was executed by electrocution on August 28, 1987.
In 1978, White was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and four counts of robbery.3 After a penalty phase, “[t]he twelve-member jury unanimously recommended that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed.”4 One source reports that the jury later said they “voted for life because [they] did not see a shred of evidence indicating that White himself actually took part in the killing.” Despite the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced White to death.5
Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, White raised nine claims. In a decision dated March 20, 1981, the Florida Supreme Court addressed four of White’s nine claims and denied relief, one of which related to the jury override. On the jury override issue, the Court wrote:
We next deal with the defendant's argument that the trial judge imposed the death sentence after a jury recommendation of life imprisonment in violation of Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975). In Tedder we held that in order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life the facts suggesting a sentence of death must be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.
In arriving at a conclusion contrary to the jury recommendation the trial judge noted that as a result of the presentence investigation and information presented at sentencing he was made aware of a number of factors which the jury did not have an opportunity to consider. Among these factors were the defendant's prior conviction of a violent felony (attempted rape) and the fact he was still on parole at the time the offenses in this case were committed (aggravating circumstances (5)(a) and (5)(b) supra), which circumstances were not established before the jury but were established before the judge at the time he rendered sentence. The trial judge also found that the defense counsel's vivid description to the jury on the effects of being electrocuted was calculated to influence a life sentence through emotional appeal. The court concluded that the death sentence was appropriate in light of the overwhelming aggravating circumstances which far outweighed any possible mitigating circumstances. After careful deliberation we conclude that the death sentence is warranted.
Although the advisory recommendation of the jury is to be accorded great weight, the ultimate decision on whether the death penalty should be imposed rests with the trial judge. Death is presumed to be the proper penalty when one or more aggravating circumstances are found unless they are outweighed by one or more mitigating circumstances.6
The Court affirmed his convictions and the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence.7 Justice Adkins concurred in result only.
His sentences of death became final in 1983 when the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
First Warrant
On January 19, 1984, Governor Graham signed a death warrant scheduling White’s execution during the week of February 3.8 A few days later, White filed motions seeking postconviction relief.
“The trial court granted [a] stay of execution and vacated [White’s] death sentences on the ground that the death sentences were constitutionally impermissible”9 in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Enmund v. Florida, which addressed the death penalty for felony murder where the defendant “does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing tak eplace or that lethal force will be employed.”10 The Florida Supreme Court extended the stay pending resolution of the State’s appeal of the trial court’s decision.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court determined that White’s case was significantly distinguishable from Enmund. As a result, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Enmund did not bar the imposition of the death penalty in White’s case and reversed the trial court’s order.11 Justice Overton concurred in part and dissenting in part, and Justice McDonald dissented.
Second Warrant
“On August 22, 1985, Governor Graham signed a second death warrant and set [White’s] execution for September 30, 1985.”12 A few days later, White filed a federal habeas petition. White’s primary claim in his federal habeas petition related to the application of Enmund to his case.
On September 23, the federal district court granted a stay of execution “to permit a fair and thorough consideration of the merits . . . prior to execution of the death sentence.”13
In a decision dated March 31, 1986, the federal district court denied White’s petition, concluding that White “ha[d] fundamentally misapprehended the Enmund findings of the Florida Supreme Court and the application of Eighth Amendment principles to the facts of [his] case.”14 The Court determined that the Florida Supreme Court “found sufficient factual basis to support the imposition of the death penalty.”
What the instant case boils down to, and what these post-Enmund non-triggerman cases teach, is that armed presence and participation in the course of subjugation and robbery or kidnapping, coupled with knowledge that lethal force will be used, is enough to meet the requirements of Enmund v. United States, supra. We think on the facts of this case, the Florida Supreme Court could reach the conclusion that it did—that Petitioner White fully realized lethal force would be used, and that he freely participated throughout—that he possessed the requisite mens rea to permit the state to sentence him to die. The State Court could find, as implicitly it did, that the purposes of both deterrence and retribution would be served by the imposition of this death sentence, that Petitioner shared the blame for these killings and thus that in the end his punishment had been tailored to “his personal responsibility and moral guilt.”15
Thus, the federal district court denied White’s petition.
White appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In a decision dated January 20, 1987, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no error.16 The U.S. Supreme Court did not deny certiorari until August 27, 1987—the day before White’s execution (discussed below).
Third Warrant & Execution
On June 4, 1987, the Governor signed a third death warrant scheduling White’s execution for the week of August 25.17
On August 19, White filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and stay of execution. In a unanimous decision the next day, authored by Justice Shaw, the Florida Supreme Court denied the petition as time-barred due to White’s delay in filing the petition, stating: “It is clear from the above that this eleventh hour petition is an abuse of process.”18
White was executed by electrocution on August 28, 1987. I was not able to find any information about his execution.
News Articles
For a full explanation of Hurst, see the five-part TFDP series available here.
Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge over Jury: Florida’s Practice of Imposing Death over Life in Capital Cases, 13 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 31, 34 (1985).
White was a codefendant of John Ferguson, who is famous for his pre-warrant litigation regarding his competency for execution. (More on that here.)
White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1981).
Id.
Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
Id. at 341.
State v. White, 470 So. 2d 1377, 1378 (Fla. 1985).
White v. Dugger, 511 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1987).
White, 470 So. 2d at 1378.
Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 797).
White v. Wainwright, 632 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1158-59.
White v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d 1478, 1481 (11th Cir. 1987).
White, 470 So. 2d at 1380.
White, 511 So. 2d at 555.