Florida Supreme Court gets rid of relative culpability review.
On Thursday, the Court determined in Cruz v. State that relative culpability review is a corollary of proportionality review, which the Court did away with in 2020.
Yesterday, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in Cruz v. State, making another change to how death sentences imposed in the State of Florida are reviewed on appeal that is adverse to capital defendants. (The video of the OA from the case is available online.)
Background of Proportionality and Relative Culpability
Prior to 2020, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed every death case for proportionality—to determine “whether death is a proportionate penalty” in the case.1 In doing so, “the Court ma[de] a ‘comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence.’ ”2 The analysis “entail[ed] ‘a qualitative review . . . of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.’ ”3 The Court would compare the aggravation and mitigation “to other similar capital cases in order to determine whether the case being reviewed fell under the category of most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.”4 The Court conducted this analysis on direct appeal regardless of whether it was raised.
In addition, where there were multiple defendants, the Court also reviewed death sentences for relative culpability. “Underlying this relative culpability review has been ‘the principle that equally culpable co-defendants should be treated alike in capital sentencing and receive equal punishment. ‘ ”5
If “the circumstances indicate that the defendant is more culpable than a codefendant, disparate treatment is not impermissible despite the fact the codefendant received a lighter sentence for his participation in the same crime.” Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1165 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 282 (Fla. 1998)). But, “[w]hen a codefendant is equally as culpable [as] or more culpable than the defendant, the disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the defendant's punishment disproportionate.” Id. (quoting Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000)).6
In 2020, the Court got rid of proportionality in Lawrence v. State. Yesterday, the Court got rid of relative culpability in Cruz v. State.
Lawrence v. State - no more proportionality
In 2020, the Florida Supreme Court—after significant changes to the Court in 20197—the Court got rid of proportionality review in its decision in Lawrence v. State. The Court concluded that proportionality review, which the Court had conducted for years, is precluded by the Florida and U.S. Constitutions. The Court reasoned that, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that proportionality review is not required under the Eighth Amendment and the Florida Constitution requires Florida to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, proportionality review is likewise barred by the Florida Constitution:
We cannot judicially rewrite our state statutes or constitution to require a comparative proportionality review that their text does not. See art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Nor can we ignore our constitutional obligation to conform our precedent respecting the Florida Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment precedent by requiring a comparative proportionality review that the Supreme Court has held the Eighth Amendment does not.
Thus, the Court did away with proportionality review.
Justice Labarga dissented, commenting on the changes the “new” Court had swiftly made to the State’s death penalty jurisprudence:
Today, the majority takes the most consequential step yet in dismantling the reasonable safeguards contained within Florida's death penalty jurisprudence—a step that eliminates a fundamental component of this Court's mandatory review in direct appeal cases.
As to proportionality, he wrote that it was a fundamental part of the capital sentencing process and the majority’s disposal of it significantly weakened the process:
Today's decision by the majority, striking proportionality review from this Court's mandatory review in death penalty appeals, leaves only the sufficiency analysis. In removing this fundamental component of proportionality review, the majority's decision threatens to render this Court's initial review of death sentences an exercise in discretion.
Cruz v. State - no more relative culpability
Yesterday, the Court extended its decision in Lawrence to get rid of relative culpability review. The Court’s reasoning was fairly simple. Because, the Court determined—based on its precedent, relative culpability was clearly “a part of [the Court’s] comparative proportionality review,” “th[e] Court’s elimination of comparative proportionality review in Lawrence also resulted in the elimination of its relative culpability review.” This sentence in the majority seems to sum it up: “[O]ur relative culpability review is a corollary of our obsolete comparative proportionality review.”
Again, Justice Labarga dissented, writing in full:
In 2020, during a series of significant changes by this Court to Florida’s death penalty jurisprudence, I strenuously dissented to the elimination of comparative proportionality review—which I described as “the most consequential step yet in dismantling the reasonable safeguards contained within Florida’s death penalty jurisprudence.” Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 552-53 (Fla. 2020) (Labarga, J., dissenting).
Today, I reiterate my dissent as the majority expressly eliminates relative proportionality review as “a corollary of our obsolete comparative proportionality review.” Majority op. at 15. I fundamentally disagree with the majority’s view that the conformity clause prohibits this Court from conducting proportionality review as a part of its review of death penalty cases. Indeed, I view proportionality review as being consistent with the Eighth Amendment prohibition of arbitrary death sentences.
Surely, in a state that leads the nation with thirty exonerations of individuals from death row, every reasonable safeguard should be retained in this Court’s toolkit when reviewing death sentences to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the most aggravated and least mitigated of murders.
I respectfully dissent.
NOTE: I usually defer to
for covering decisions from the Florida Supreme Court on a weekly basis, and I recommend subscribing there to stay up-to-date. However, I thought this one was worth covering here.Yacob v. State, 136 So.3d 539, 549 (Fla. 2014) (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
Cruz v. State, slip op. at 8.
Id. (citation omitted).
McCloud v. State, 208 So.3d 668, 687 (Fla. 2016).