Florida Supreme Court rolls back Miranda rights
Today, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Penna. It is not a capital case but affects Florida criminal cases across the board.
Penna came to the Court on a certified question from the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Specifically, the Fourth District asked the Court “if Miranda is ‘automatically violated’ when an officer does not ‘re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact’ with law enforcement.” Receding from the Court’s 2018 holding in Shelly v. State, the Court answered the question in the negative.
Background
In Miranda v. Arizona in 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court established certain procedural safeguards for criminal defendants when being interrogated by police. The Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”1 That holding led to what society knows commonly as “being read Miranda rights.”
Shelly v. State
In Shelly, the Florida Supreme Court addressed an issue of express and direct conflict between the Fourth District’s decision and the Court’s 2008 decision in Welch v. State regarding the appropriate use of Miranda rights when an accused re-approaches law enforcement. In Shelly, the Court reaffirmed that the standard set forth in Welch was the appropriate standard “when an accused has invoked his or her right to counsel or silence, and then is alleged to have subsequently reinitiated communication with officers.”2 In such situations, the Court held, Miranda rights must be given again.
State v. Penna
In today’s decision, the Court determined that the “per se rule that [the Court announced in Shelly is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.”
Relevant Facts
After committing several crimes, Penna was detained by officers and taken to the hospital for medical treatment. The next day, a Detective “went to the hospital to speak with Penna,” who “was shackled to his bed and on several medications.”
At the outset of their conversation, the Detective “asked Penna if he had been advised of his Miranda rights.” Penna began listing his rights, but the Detective proceeded to “read Penna the Miranda warnings as listed on his department-issued card.” The Detective “then began asking questions related to the murders. Penna answered the first few questions, generally denying that he recognized the murder victims or their home.” After being asked “how he came to have possession of the [victims’] stolen SUV, Penna invoked his right to counsel. At that point,” the Detective “stopped questioning Penna and left the room.” Later that day, another detective entered Penna’s room, and he again invoked his right to counsel.
“Penna remained in a hospital for roughly a month and a half, always restrained to his bed” and “constantly monitor[ed]” by law enforcement. Approximately a month after the murders, Penna asked the Deputy assigned to monitor him why he was in the hospital. The Deputy responded, “[Y]ou don’t know why you’re here?”
“A short time later, Penna volunteered to [the Deputy] that he had ‘stabbed a couple of people.’ In response to a clarifying question [by the Deputy], Penna confessed to stabbing a police dog and confirmed that he had stabbed two men.” A few days later, Penna had another similar conversation with the same Deputy. The next day, Penna spoke to the Deputy again about his potential punishment.
At that point, Penna told [the Deputy] that he would share what happened. [The Deputy] reminded Penna that he was an officer and would write down his statements. In addition, [the Deputy] also cautioned Penna against talking unless he wanted to. [The Deputy], though, stopped short of giving Miranda warnings to Penna. Penna proceeded to offer additional details about his crime spree.
Penna initiated another similar conversation approximately a week later and then again two weeks later.
Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements he made to the Deputy, “arguing that such statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.” The trial court denied Penna’s motion in its entirety, stressing that Penna initiated all the conversations with [the Deputy]. Thus, in the court’s view, Penna had failed to establish a Miranda violation.” Several of Penna’s statements were presented at trial. Penna was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.
Fourth DCA’s Decision
On appeal, the Fourth District found that the “statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda” because they “were not the products of police interrogation.” However, the majority determined that the Deputy that Deputy “violated Miranda by failing to ‘specifically’ give Penna ‘his Miranda rights again’ prior to custodial interrogation during the final three conversations.” The Court then granted the State’s request to certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
WHETHER A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT MIRANDA RIGHTS ARE AUTOMATICALLY VIOLATED WHEN AN OFFICER FAILS TO RE-READ A MIRANDA WARNING FOLLOWING A DEFENDANT’S VOLUNTARY RE-INITIATION OF CONTACT.
Majority’s decision
The majority explains that, based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, “[w]hen a suspect unequivocally invokes the Miranda right to counsel, the officers must immediately stop questioning the suspect. However, that invocation does not mean that law enforcement may never again question the suspect in a custodial setting.” (Citations omitted.) Determining whether “post-invocation statements violate Miranda, the Court said, is a two-part test:
“The defendant must reinitiate contact with police.”
“[T]here must be a valid waiver of the Miranda rights already invoked.”
The State argued that the rule announced in Shelly - that the accused either be reminded or readvised of his/her Miranda rights - “is incompatible with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.” The Court agreed, finding that “Shelly improperly expanded [the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in] Bradshaw by adding a new requirement.” To recede from Shelly, the majority relies on the Court’s decision in Poole, in which the Court receded from its prior holding in Hurst v. State.3
The Court concluded:
For these reasons, we now recede from Shelly’s categorical remind-or-readvise requirement. In doing so, we reiterate that Bradshaw provides the proper standard which should be applied in this case. That standard asks two things: (1) did the suspect reinitiate contact with police and, if so, (2) did he knowingly and voluntarily waive his earlier-invoked Miranda rights. The latter inquiry turns on the totality of the circumstances. We add a final observation. Although we hold that there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights, evidence of such would certainly be relevant to an overall analysis of whether the defendant voluntarily waived those rights.4
Justice Labarga dissenting
Justice Labarga dissented, writing that the Florida Constitution provides protection against self-incrimination and “state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.” (Citations omitted.)
The full decision can be accessed here.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (U.S. 1966).
Shelly v. State, 262 So. 3d 1, 13 (Fla. 2018).
Footnote omitted.