NEW WARRANT: Thomas Gudinas' execution scheduled June 24
Gov. DeSantis has signed a death warrant scheduling Thomas Lee Gudinas’ execution for June 24 at 6:00 p.m.
Gov. DeSantis has signed a death warrant scheduling Thomas Lee Gudinas’ execution for June 24 at 6:00 p.m.
The Florida Supreme Court a Scheduling Order for warrant-related litigation setting forth the following schedule:
June 5 at 2:00 p.m.: circuit court proceedings complete
June 5 at 5:00 p.m.: notice of appeal and writ petition due
June 9 at 10:00 a.m.: initial brief due
June 10 at 3:00 p.m.: answer brief due
June 11 at 11:00 a.m.: reply brief due
The warrant and Scheduling Order can be downloaded on the Court’s docket here.
Background of Gudinas’ Case
Trial and Direct Appeal
In Orange County in May 1995, Thomas Gudinas was convicted of killing Michelle McGrath in May 1994. The facts are as follows:
Gudinas and three of his roommates arrived at an Orlando bar, Barbarella's, between approximately 8:30 and 9 p.m. on May 23, 1994. Prior to arriving at the bar, the group drank beer and smoked marijuana at their apartment and in the car on the way to the bar. While drinking throughout the night, Gudinas and his roommates periodically returned to their car to smoke marijuana. However, when the bar closed at 3 a.m, Gudinas could not be located. One of Gudinas' roommates, Todd Gates, testified that he last saw Gudinas in the bar at approximately 1 a.m.
Rachelle Smith and her fiancé arrived at the same bar between 11 and 11:30 p.m. They stayed until about 2 a.m. Rachelle left the bar at that time, while her fiancé remained inside saying goodbye to friends. She initially went to the wrong parking lot where she saw a man watching her while crouched behind another car. Realizing she was in the wrong parking lot, Rachelle walked to the lot where her car was parked. Because she felt she was being followed, she immediately got into her car and locked the door. Looking into her mirror, she saw the same man she had just seen crouched behind a car in the other parking lot. After trying to open Rachelle's passenger side door, the man crouched down, came around to the driver's side and tried to open the door. While screaming at Rachelle, “I want to f___ you,” the man covered his hand with his shirt and began smashing the driver's side window. Rachelle blew the horn and the man left. Upon hearing of the murder that occurred nearby that same night, Rachelle contacted police, gave a description of the man, and identified Gudinas from a photographic lineup as the man who tried to attack her. She also identified Gudinas at trial.
The victim, Michelle McGrath, was last seen at Barbarella's at approximately 2:45 a.m. She apparently had left her car in the same parking lot where Rachelle Smith first saw Gudinas crouching behind a car. Between 4 and 5 a.m., Culbert Pressley found Michelle's keys and a bundle of clothes next to her car in the parking lot. Her body was discovered at about 7:30 a.m. in an alley next to Pace School. Michelle was naked, except for a bra which was pushed up above her breasts.
Jane Brand flagged down Officer Chisari of the Orlando police bicycle patrol. Officer Chisari had been informed by a deputy sheriff on the scene that Pressley had found some keys. Pressley then told Chisari he had just given them to “that guy,” referring to a man walking south. As Chisari then rode toward the man, Ms. Brand screamed as she spotted Michelle's body. Chisari returned to where Ms. Brand was. Subsequently, he saw a man he later identified as Gudinas driving a red Geo Metro from the parking lot where Michelle had parked her car. Pressley wrote down the car's license plate and the tag number was traced to Michelle McGrath. The car was later recovered at 7 p.m. that night at the Holiday Club Apartments.1
After convicting Gudinas of first-degree murder and other crimes, the trial proceeded to the penalty phase. The jury ultimately recommended that Gudinas be sentenced to death by a vote of 10-2.2
On June 16, 1995, the trial court sentenced Gudinas to death, along with other sentences for the other crimes. The trial court found the following aggravation:
(1) the defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1995); (2) the murder was committed during the commission of a sexual battery, section 921.141(5)(d); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h). The court found one statutory mitigator: the defendant committed the murder while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b). 3
The trial court found the following mitigation and assigned each “very little weight”:
(1) defendant had consumed cannabis and alcohol the evening of the homicide; (2) defendant had the capacity to be rehabilitated; (3) defendant's behavior at trial was acceptable; (4) defendant had an IQ of 85; (5) defendant was religious and believed in God; (6) defendant's father dressed as a transvestite; (7) defendant suffered from personality disorders; (8) defendant was developmentally impaired as a child; (9) defendant was a caring son to his mother; (10) defendant was an abused child; (11) defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder as a child; and (12) defendant was diagnosed as sexually disturbed as a child.4
On direct appeal, Gudinas raised twelve claims. on April 10, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Gudinas’ conviction and sentence of death. Justice Anstead concurred in part and dissented in part, writing: “The sentencing order is inadequate and in direct violation of our explicit holdings in numerous cases requiring particularized treatment of mitigating factors.” Chief Justice Kogan joined.
Gudinas’ death sentence became final on October 20, 1997.
Initial Postconviction & Habeas
On June 5, 1998, Gudinas filed a motion for postconviction relief. He amended the motion on July 1999 and again on September 30, 1999.5 On December 17, 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Gudinas’ claims. Later, the court denied Gudinas’ claims. On appeal, on March 28, 2002, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Most of his claims related to “effectiveness of counsel” and “warrant discussion.”
Gudinas also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the following claims:
(1) the prosecutor's misconduct during penalty phase closing argument rendered death sentence unreliable; (2) the trial court's errors in rejecting the statutory mitigator that Gudinas' ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirement of the law was substantially impaired; (3) the trial court's refusal to sever counts I and II from the remaining charges; (4) the Florida death sentencing statute is unconstitutional; (5) the cumulative effect of the errors made in his trial; and, (6) Gudinas may be incompetent at the time of execution thus violating his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.6
The Court also denied the petition.
Federal Habeas
On October 15, 2002, Gudinas filed a federal petition for habeas corpus, raising 18 claims:
(1) The trial court's refusal to sever counts I and II from the remaining charges violated Gudinas' due process rights to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution;
(2) Gudinas was involuntarily excluded from certain pretrial hearings, denying his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Counsel's failure to preserve this issue denied Gudinas his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights;
(3) Gudinas' conviction on Count II of the indictment, attempted sexual battery of Rachelle Smith, violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because there is insufficient evidence: no proof of an overt act in furtherance of the attempt;
(4) The trial court admitted into evidence gruesome photographs rendering Gudinas' trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. To the extent that the trial counsel failed to litigate and preserve this issue, Gudinas was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel;
(5) Improper bolstering of a witness by the introduction of a prior consistent hearsay statement denied Gudinas due process and a fair trial guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; Counsel's failure to preserve the issue denied Gudinas effective assistance of counsel violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(6) Irrelevant prejudicial collateral evidence and counsel's failure to preserve the issue denied Gudinas due process, a fair trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(7) The State amended the indictment by jury instruction and argument, resulting in a verdict insufficient as a matter of law, denying Gudinas due process, a fair trial, and effective counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(8) Trial court restricted presentation of defense evidence, denying Gudinas due process and a trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(9) Prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase denied Gudinas due process, a fair trial, and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(10) The jury recommend [sic] was tainted by improper and inadequate instruction, which denied Gudinas due process, a fair trial, and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(11) The court's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(12) The trial court's error in considering mitigation renders the sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(13) Rejection of the statutory mitigator that Gudinas' ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the standards of law was substantially impaired renders the death sentence arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(14) Ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase denied Gudinas due process, a fair trial, and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(15) Ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt phase denied Gudinas due process, a fair trial, and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(16) Florida rules barring juror interviews violate equal protection principles, and the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(17) Cumulative error denied Gudinas due process, and a fair trial and appeal, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(18) The judgment and sentence must be vacated in light of Ring v. Arizona.7
On September 30, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the petition “in part as procedurally defaulted” and otherwise denied Gudinas’ claims.8
On July 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial.9
Successive Postconviction
Also in October 2002, Gudinas filed a successive postconviction motion challenging his death sentence in light of Ring and Apprendi.10 The circuit court denied the claim on January 7, 2003. On appeal, on May 13, 2004, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial.
After Hurst,11 Gudinas again sought sought relief under the Sixth Amendment—a claim he had raised several times by this point. In 2018, the Florida Supreme Court denied his claim because his sentence became final before 2002.
My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.
Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 956-57 (Fla. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 959.
Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1099 (Fla. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Gudinas v. McNeil, 2010 WL 3835776, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2010).
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *1.
Gudinas v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 436 Fed. App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2011).
Gudinas v. State, 879 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2004).